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Abstract
In this essay, I will argue that there are moral requirements which are requirements of
practical reason that apply to all agents independent of their motives. First, I will outline
the argument for the thesis of reason internalism and then briefly set up the resulting
problem for the rational authority of morality. To resolve this problem, I will argue for a
principle of reason transmission. From this principle, I will argue that there are cases in
which agents fail to have a reason for action, regardless of their motivations. Further, I
argue that these are universal requirements. Thus, I conclude that there are actions that
rationality requires all agents not to do.
1.1 Introduction
The problem for the rational authority of morality results from the apparent
inconsistency of the theses of moral objectivity, moral internalism, reason internalism,
and egoism. However, I will argue that there is no problem for the rational authority of
morality and that these four theses are in fact consistent with each other. To do so, I will
argue for a principle of reason transmission and show that, in virtue of this principle of
reason transmission and reason internalism, there are cases in which agents fail to have a
reason for action, regardless of their motivations. Furthermore, that these are universal
requirements and thus there are actions that rationality requires all agents not to do.
1.2 Reason Internalism
Reason internalism is an answer to the question as to whether external reasons for
action exist. External reasons are understood as reasons for action that are independent of
the agent’s motivations. In contrast, internal reasons for action are those which depend on
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the agent’s motivations. Famously, Bernard Williams argued that external reasons for
action do not exist. His argument for such a conclusion is as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

If a reason is a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason for acting
on a particular occasion.
If it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion, then it
would figure in an explanation of that action.
No external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s
action.
Thus, an external reason could not be someone’s reason for acting on a
particular occasion.
Therefore, an external reason cannot be a reason for action.1

The significance of this argument is that if an external reason cannot be a reason for
action, then all reasons for action must be dependent on the agent’s motivations. As
Christine Korsgaard notes, “it seems to be a requirement on practical reasons, that they be
capable of motivating us.” 2 This requirement can be formalized as a necessary condition
for being a reason for an action.
(Reason Internalism) There is a reason for A to do X only if doing X satisfies some
element of A’s subjective motivational set.3
However, this requirement poses a central problem for any ethical theory that supposes
the rational authority of morality.
1.3 The Problem for the Rational Authority of Morality
The problem is that the thesis of reason internalism is incompatible with the
following three theses taken together:
(Moral Objectivity) Moral requirements apply to all agents independent of their motives.
(Moral Internalism) Moral requirements are requirements of practical reason.
(Egoism) There is no necessary connection between the motives of different agents. 4
1

Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 295.
2
Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Jounral of Philosophy, 83, no. 1 (1986): 11.
3
Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 292-298.
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Together the first two theses entail that morality provides agents with categorical
imperatives. These categorical imperatives are requirements of practical reason that apply
to all agents independent of their motives. There seems to be a problem for the rational
authority of morality, if we accept egoism and reason internalism. The problem is that if
we take these two theses seriously, then “the man who rejects morality because he sees
no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. Nor will
his actions necessarily be irrational.”5 In other words, egoism and reason internalism
entails that morality cannot have any rational authority; morality cannot universally
provide agents with reasons for action.
In an attempt to resolve this inconsistency, philosophers have argued for the
rejection of each of the different theses. For the remainder of this essay, I will argue that
there is no problem for the rational authority of morality. In other words, I will argue that
these four theses are consistent with each other. I do concede that reason internalism and
the thesis of egoism are inconsistent with some categorical imperatives; in particular,
those categorical imperatives that require agents to do certain actions, or positive duties.
However, as I will argue, there is no inconsistency with categorical imperatives that
require agents to not do certain actions, or negative duties.
2.1 The Principle of Instrumental Reasoning
The most familiar principle of practical reason is the principle of instrumental
reasoning. This principle states that by willing an end, rationality requires that one wills
the necessary means to that end. In other words, if I intend an end, then I should take the

4

David Brink, "A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality," Nous-Supplement: Philosophical
Perspectives, 6 (1992): 1.
5
Foot Philippa, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology,
ed. Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 289.
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necessary means to that end. However, this is not the principle of practical reason needed
to show what reasons for action there are for an agent. First, this principle derives a
normative claim from a seemingly non-normative claim; that I should take the means to
my ends is surely normative, whereas intending an end is not apparently so. If intending,
or willing, an end is not normative, then we are faced with Hume’s objection that one
cannot generate an “ought” from an “is.” Christine Korsgaard addresses this problem by
arguing that “you must think that the fact that you will an end is a reason for the end.”6
Thinking that the fact that you will an end is a reason for that end may make the means
normative, you should think there is a reason for the means to that end, but thinking so
does not, by its self, make it the case that there is a reason for the end or the means.
Clearly, there is a difference between thinking that the fact that you will an end is
a reason for the end and it being the case that there is a reason for the end. To see that
intention is not normative in this way, we need only to look at an example from Bernard
Williams. Suppose there is a glass of clear liquid before me and I have a thirst for a gin
and tonic. Believing the clear liquid to be gin, I intend to mix it with tonic and drink it.
Yet, suppose that the clear liquid is in fact petrol. Though I intend to mix it with tonic and
drink it, we want to say that I do not have a reason to do so. 7 Through this example, we
can see that intending to do something is not the same as there being a reason to do so.
2.2 The Right Kind of “Should”
Additionally, we should draw a distinction concerning different senses of the term
“should.” As such, the “should” used in the instrumental principle is not the reason for

6

Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," The Constitution of Agency, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 58.
7
Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 293.
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action “should.” Rather, this is the “should” of good practical thought.8 To explicate this
concept of “good practical thought” as distinct from “reason for action,” let us return to
the example from Williams. In the example, we can say that since I intend to mix the
clear liquid with tonic and drink it and to do so I must fetch some tonic, then the principle
of instrumental reason states that I should fetch some tonic. This “should” is a “should”
of good practical thought, not reason for action. This can be seen, if we again suppose
that the clear liquid is not gin, but rather petrol. In this case, it is not true that I have a
reason to mix the clear liquid with tonic and drink it. Thus, it is not true that I have a
reason to fetch the tonic. However, since I intend to mix it with tonic and drink it, it is
“reasonable” that I fetch the tonic. In other words, by fetching the tonic, though I do not
have a reason to do so, I am still acting rationally or, as Williams would say, I am acting
rational relative to a false belief.9 Thus, when the instrumental principle states that I
should do M, it is saying that to be rational, relative to my intention to do E, I must do M.
However, it is not saying is that there is a reason for me to do M.
2.3 A Different Principle of Practical Reason
Taking this into account, we should use a similar, but distinct principle of
practical reason. This is the principle of means-end transmission, which states that:
(Transmission) If you should do E, all things considered, and doing M is a necessary
means to doing E, then you should do M, all things considered, too.10
The principle of transmission avoids the difficulties of the instrumental principle. It
derives a normative claim from another normative claim and thus is not subject to

8

Kieran Setiya, "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," Ethics, 117, no. 4 (2007): 649-673.
Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, ed. Russ
Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 293.
10
Kieran Setiya, "Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason," Ethics, 117, no. 4 (2007): 652.
9
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Hume’s criticism. Furthermore, it is the appropriate kind of “should,” the reason for
action “should.” Though this principle is different than the instrumental principle, it gets
to the intuition about means-end reasoning that leads many to accept the principle of
instrumental reasoning.
2.4 Necessary Means
If we understand this “should” as the reason for action “should,” one may
question why having a reason to do E commits them to having a reason to do M.11 The
answer seems to be that M is necessary for doing E. However, one may ask, what is it for
M to be “necessary” for doing E? We can understand being a necessary means as being
part of the conditions of satisfaction of E. A condition of satisfaction of E is that which
cannot fail to be the case, if it is to be the case that E. It is that which cannot fail to be the
case, if one is to be judged as to have successfully done E.12 We can offer two accounts
of being a part of the conditions of satisfaction:
(Specific Account) M is part of the conditions of satisfaction for A to do E iff in this
particular case it cannot fail to be the case that M, if A does E.
(General Account) M is part of the conditions of satisfaction for A to do E iff in all cases
it cannot fail to be the case that M, if A does E.
As such, the set of M’s entailed by the general account is a subset of the set of M’s entail
by the specific account. To clarify these accounts, let us look to an example from John
Searle.
Suppose that there is a reason for me to fix your tooth and it is true of this
particular case that if I fix your tooth, then I will cause you pain. On the specific account,

11
12

John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 263-266.
John Searle, Rationality in Action, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 263-266.
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we would conclude that, in virtue of my reason to fix your tooth, I have a reason to cause
you pain. This is because, in this particular case, I cannot fix your tooth without it being
the case that I cause you pain. Though it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of fixing
your tooth in this particular case, it is not part of the conditions of satisfaction for fixing
your tooth in all cases. For example, had the facts about this case been different and I
failed to cause you pain, it would not entail that I failed to fix your tooth; maybe in this
different case I am a much better dentist or used anesthetics. Therefore, on the general
account, we would conclude that I do not have a reason to cause you pain; causing you
pain is at most a by-product of fixing your tooth.
In so far as the set of M’s entailed by the general account is a subset of the set of
M’s entailed by the specific account, it is sufficient for our purposes to move forward
using the general account. For if we can show that an agent has a negative duty with
regards to an M entailed by the general account, then that duty with regards to that M will
apply to agents in all cases. Thus it provides the universality required for a categorical
imperative. To show that an agent has a negative duty with regards to an M entailed by
the specific account, but which is not entailed by the general account will require a
further argument that I will not provide in this essay. Considering this account of
“necessary means” and understanding that this “should” is the “should” of practical
reason for action, we can define the principle of transmission as:
(Transmission*) If there is a reason to do E, all things considered, and doing M is part of
the conditions of satisfaction of E, then there is a reason to do M, all things considered,
too.
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2.5 All Things Considered
Some may question what is meant by the qualification “all things considered.” It
should be understood as the conditions for being an all-in practical reason for action,
which is different than being a pro tanto practical reason for action. The pro tanto
practical reason counts in favor of doing an action, but it is “slack” in that I can fail to act
for a pro tanto practical reason and still be rational.13 However, if I failed to act for my
all-in practical reason for action, then I would have failed to act rationally. The all-in
practical reason for action is based on all the relevant facts. This includes the fact about
how the agent weighs the elements of her subjective motivational set. Now, I want to be
careful and clarify that I am not supposing that any principle of reasoning is involved in
the weighing of the elements of the agent’s subjective motivational set. The principle of
transmission is compatible with various theories about how these elements could be
weighed. The reason that figures in the principle of transmission is that reason which the
agent has posterior to the elements have been weighed. Further, the “weighing” of the
elements need not be a deliberate conscious process; the agent need not be aware of how
the elements of her subjective motivational set are weighed.
2.6 An Equivalent Principle of Transmission
The principle of transmission can be reformulated into a principle that states when
there fails to be a reason to do E, all things considered, that is equivalent to
transmission*:
(Transmission**) If there is no reason to do M, all things considered, and doing M is
part of the conditions of satisfaction of E, then there is no reason to do E, all things
considered, too.
13

John Broome, "Normative Requirements," Ratio, 12, no. 4 (1999): 398-419.

Barrett, Kyle, 2013, UMSL, P. 9
It is easy to see how this is equivalent to transmission*. Suppose that there is no reason to
do M, all things considered. By modus tollens on the conditional that is transmission*,
we can infer that the conjunction “there is a reason to do E, all things considered, and
doing M is part of the conditions of satisfaction of E” is false. We know that a
conjunction is false when either one or both the conjuncts are false. If we suppose that it
is true that doing M is part of the conditions of satisfaction of E, then we can infer it is
false that there is a reason to do E, all things considered.
3.1 Reasons for the Conditions of Satisfaction to be Met
In this section, I hope to demonstrate that, in virtue of transmission**, there are
particular kinds of cases in which an agent can fail to have a reason to do an action
despite the agent’s motivations to do that action. In particular, there can fail to be a
reason to engage in sex with or end the life of another person because of the necessary
means for doing such actions.
The Case of having Sex with Another Person
In the case of having sex with another person, if anyone is to successfully have
sex with another person, then that other person cannot fail to have sex with that person.
For example, in order for Jack to have sex with Jill, Jill must have sex with Jack. Jack
could not have successfully had sex with Jill, if Jill failed to have had sex with Jack. Jill’s
having sex with Jack is a necessary means for Jack to have sex with Jill; it is part of the
conditions of satisfaction of Jack having sex with Jill. Furthermore, this is true not just in
the case of Jack and Jill, but in all cases in which anyone has sex with another person.
Knowing the conditions of satisfaction for having sex with another person, we
must ask whether there is a reason, all things considered, for these conditions to be met.
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In other words, is there a reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack? I
contend that, in virtue of reason internalism, whether such a reason exists depends on Jill
and her motivations, not Jack and his motivations. Since reason internalism states that
there is a reason for A to do X only if doing X satisfies some element of A’s subjective
motivational set, then there is a reason for Jill to have sex with Jack only if having sex
with Jack satisfies some element of Jill’s subjective motivational set. Furthermore, the
principle of transmission requires that this reason not be a pro tanto reason, but rather a
reason all things considered. Thus, for there to be a reason, all things considered, for Jill
to have sex with Jack, there must be an element which having sex with Jack would satisfy
that outweighs those elements that not having sex with Jack would satisfy. Certainly,
there are cases in which there could be such a reason. Yet, surely it could also be the case
that there is no reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack. In such cases
where there is no reason, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack, we should
conclude from transmission** that there is no reason for Jack to have sex with Jill, all
things considered.
The Case of Ending Another Person’s Life
Likewise, in order for anyone to end the life of another person, it cannot fail to be
the case that the other person never does anything ever again. For example, in order for
Bob to have ended Bill’s life, Bill must not do anything ever again. Bob could not have
successfully ended Bill’s life, if Bill went on to engage in various future activities.14 Bill
not doing anything ever again is part of the conditions of satisfaction of Bob ending Bill’s

14

This is our natural understanding of the conditions for being dead; leaving out the possibility of divine
intervention or the “living dead.” Furthermore, it is true that not doing various activities is not sufficient for
being dead, but it does seem to be necessary.
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life. Again, this is true not just in the case of Bob and Bill, but in all cases in which
anyone ends the life of another person.
Knowing the conditions of satisfaction for ending the life of another person, we
again must ask whether there is a reason, all things considered, for these conditions to be
met. In other words, is there a reason, all things considered, for Bill to never do anything
ever again? Again, in virtue of reason internalism, whether such a reason exists depends
on Bill and his motivations, not Bob and his motivations. Reason internalism requires
that for there to be a reason for Bill to never do anything ever again, that it be true that
never doing anything ever again would satisfy some element in Bill’s subjective
motivational set or that there is no element of Bill’s subjective motivational set that any
future activity would satisfy. Additionally, that element which never doing anything ever
again would satisfy must outweigh every element that would be satisfied by doing
something. Again, there could be cases in which there are reasons, all things considered,
to never do anything ever again. Yet, it could also be the case that there is a reason, all
things considered, for Bill to do something in the future. In cases where there is a reason,
all things considered, for Bill to do something in the future, we should conclude from
transmission** that there is no reason for Bob to end Bill’s life, all things considered.
3.2 Explanation of Actions
One may object that this is just not true. Jack, having weighed the elements of his
subjective motivational set, is most motivated to have sex with Jill. Moreover, Jack’s
motivation can explain both Jack’s and Jill’s actions. The objection is that Jack’s
motivation meets the internalist requirement for being a reason for action. Similarly, Bob
is most motivated to end Bill’s life and his motivation can explain why Bill never does
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anything ever again. This too meets the internalist requirement for being a reason for
action. Therefore, there is a reason for Jack to have sex with Jill and a reason for Bob to
end Bill’s life.
The problem with this objection is that it has confused an explanatory reason with
a normative reason. It is true that both Jack’s and Bob’s motivations would explain their
actions, as well as Jill’s and Bill’s actions. Furthermore, it is true that reason internalism
requires that normative reasons for action be explanatory of the actions; it must be able to
function in an explanation of the action. However, it is not true that an explanation is
sufficient for being a normative reason for action. The difference is between explaining
an action and guiding an action. Something that guides can be referenced so as to explain
an action, however explanations are not themselves guides. If Jack’s and Bob’s
motivations are normative reasons at all, they might be pro tanto reasons for Jack to have
sex with Jill and Bob to end Bill’s life. However, Jack’s and Bob’s motivations, by
themselves,15 could not be reasons, all things considered, for Jill to have sex with Jack or
for Bill to never do anything ever again. This is because such motivations, by themselves,
fail to be motivating for Jill and Bill and thus could never have guided their actions.
3.3 The Guidance of Actual Actions
One may argue that regardless of the Jill’s and Bill’s motivations, Jack and Bob
will do what they themselves are most motivated to do. Since having sex with Jill and
ending Bill’s life is what Jack and Bob are most motivated to do, this is what they will
do. Since they will act because of their motivations, their motivations are action guiding
and thus are normative reasons for action. However, this argument fails because such

15

By “by themselves” I mean that there are no corresponding motivations in Jill’s or Bill’s subjective
motivational set. For example, neither Jill or Bill has the motivation to satisfy Jack’s or Bob’s motivations.
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motivations ultimately could not be action guiding. If what an agent is most motivated to
do is just the motivation for which the agent did act, then this motivation could not be
action guiding. It could not be action guiding because the agent could not fail to be
guided. We cannot be guided by our motivations, if anything we do would count as
following it.16 Therefore, being the motivations for which an agent actually acts is not
sufficient for being a normative reason.
3.4 Different Reasons for Different Agents
Why could we not just say that there is a reason for Jack to have sex with Jill and
Bob to end Bill’s life and no reason for Jill to have sex with Jack and Bill to have his life
ended by Bob? As previously stated, Jack and Bob could have reasons for such actions,
but that these are merely pro tanto reasons. In order to be all-in practical reasons, they
must be reasons all things considered. Within the scope of all the things that need to be
considered are the reasons for the necessary means for doing that action. For if there fails
to be a reason, all things considered, for the necessary means of an action, then a pro
tanto reason to do that action is defeated. For example, Nathan has a pro tanto reason to
burn down his house, doing so would satisfy his desire to be warm, but no longer having
shelter is part of the conditions of satisfaction of burning down his house.17 Suppose that
Nathan has no reason, all things considered, to be without shelter. As such, Nathan’s pro
tanto reason to burn down his house is defeated because he fails to have a reason for the
necessary means.

16

Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," The Constitution of Agency, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 41.
17
I am supposing that Nathan does not have other means of shelter. Though this is a case in which I am
appealing to conditions of satisfaction that are entailed by the specific account, it still explicates how not
having a reason for the necessary means will defeat the pro tanto reasons for an end.
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Likewise, in addition to the motivations of Jack and Bob and the resulting pro
tanto reasons, the reasons for the necessary means for performing such actions need to be
considered. Being that these are cases of interactions between agents, to meet the
conditions of satisfaction for such actions entails that the other agents do or not do some
or any action. Just as in the case of an action involving only one agent, if there fails to be
a reason, all things considered, for the necessary means of an action, then a pro tanto
reason to do that action is defeated. Thus, Jack’s and Bob’s pro tanto reasons are defeated
when there fails to be a reason for the necessary means of their respective actions. As
stated in section 3.1, if there fails to be a reason for Jill to have sex with Jack and Bill to
never do anything again, then Jack’s pro tanto reason to have sex with Jill and Bob’s pro
tanto reason to end Bill’s life are defeated. Thus, there is no reason for jack to have sex
with Jill and Bob to end Bill’s life, all things considered.
3.5 Universal Rational Requirement
Since Transmission** is a material conditional, every case in which the
antecedent is true the consequent must also be true. So, it is never the case that there is a
reason for someone to have sex with another person, if there is no reason for that other
person to have sex with them. Also, it is never the case that there is a reason for someone
to end another person’s life, if there is a reason for that other person to do something.
Furthermore, if there is no reason for an agent to do E, then rationality seems to require
that the agent ought not to do E. Therefore, everyone ought not to have sex with another
person, if there is no reason for that other person to have sex with them and everyone
ought not to end another person’s life, if there is a reason for that other person to do
something. These are categorical imperatives, negative duties required of all agents.
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4.1 Further Objections
Now one may want to object that such universal rational requirements violate the
thesis of reason internalism, since the required actions may not satisfy any element of an
agent’s subjective motivational set. However, reason internalism only requires that the
action satisfy some motivation, if there is a reason for the agent to do something.
Whereas these negative duties state that there is no reason for the agent to do certain
actions. There not being a reason for an action need not satisfy some motivation. For
example, being without a motivation makes it the case that I have no reason to do some
action. Further, reason requires that I do not do that action, if I have no reason to do it.
Acting without a reason for that action would certainly be irrational.
With this said, one may question why I argued that it fails to be the case that there
is no reason for Bill to do anything ever again to the conclusion that there is no reason for
Bob to end Bill’s life. The objection is that according to the argument in the previous
paragraph, in order for there to be no reason for Bill to do anything ever again, not doing
anything need not satisfy any of Bill’s motivations. It being the case that there is no
reason for Bill to do anything ever again is consistent with any of Bill’s motivations. Just
as there is no reason for Bob to end Bill’s life is consistent with any of Bob’s
motivations.
These two cases do seem to be very similar. However, there is one major
difference between the two. Bob is required to not do one action, whereas Bill would be
required to not do any action he could possibly be motivated to do. Rationality would
require a lot more of Bill than it does Bob, presumably too much more. I have not argued,
and will not argue, for a thesis about the sufficient conditions for there being a reason for
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action. Yet, I will suppose that of all the future actions that would satisfy some elements
of Bill’s subjective motivational set, there would be at least one that would meet these
conditions.
4.2 Intended Actions without Reasons
Suppose an agent intends to do some action which that agent has no reason to do.
For example, Jill intends to have sex with Jack, though she has no reason to do so. Jack
finds Jill sexually attractive, does Jack have a reason, all things, considered, to have sex
with Jill? Since Jill does not have a reason to have sex with Jack, Jack does not have a
reason, all things considered, to have sex with Jill. Were Jack to have sex with Jill
knowing only Jill’s intentions, we could say that Jack acted rationally, relative to a false
belief, such as we did in Williams’s example about the tonic and petrol. We could say in
some sense that he acted rationally, but he ought not to have had sex with Jill. Though, if
Jack had all the true relevant facts knowing whether Jill had a reason, all things
considered, to have sex with him and he still had sex with Jill, then we would say he did
not act rationally and he ought not to have done so.
4.3 Reductio Ad Absurdum
Others may object that my reasoning requires too much; that one ought not to buy
beer, that two boxers ought not to hit each other, and that one ought not to hang a murder.
The Case of Beer Money
Suppose that the money I spend on beer could have gone to buying food for a
starving person. One may argue that it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of my
spending that money on beer that the starving person continues to starve. Yet, we suppose
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that there is no reason for the starving person to continue to starve and thus no reason for
me to buy beer.
The problem with this objection is that according to our general account of
“necessary means,” the fact that the starving person continues to starve is not part of the
conditions of satisfaction of my buying beer in all cases. We can imagine a case in which
I spend my money on beer, but Peter Singer, being motivated to bring about more good in
the world, buys the starving man food. Thus, I can be judged to have successfully
purchased the beer even if the starving man fails to continue to starve.
The Case of the Boxers
Suppose that Joe and George are in a boxing match. Joe’s hitting George will hurt
George. George has no reason to allow himself to be hurt and good reason to avoid the
punches. One may object that it follows from my reasoning that Joe has no reason to hit
George, but this is absurd since Joe has a reason to hit George, so as to win the match.
It is true that it would be absurd in this case for Joe to not have a reason to hit
George. However, the problem with this objection is that it would be absurd for George
to enter into a boxing match if he has a reason, all things considered, to not allow himself
to be hit. If George has a reason, all things considered, to enter into a boxing match, then
George has a reason, all things considered, to allow himself to be hit in virtue of his
reason to enter into the boxing match. This is because it is part of the necessary means of
being in a boxing match that each boxer has a reason to hit each other, so as to win the
match.18 Now, George does have a reason to avoid getting hit, so as to win the boxing

18

It does seem possible that there could be a boxing match in which one boxer fails to hit the other.
However, even in this case the one boxer has a reason to hit the other boxer. One may object that a boxer
may fail to have a reason to hit the other boxer, if one boxer has a reason to lose the match (maybe that
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match, but upon entering this competition he has provided Joe with a reason to hit him.
This is just what it is to be in a boxing match. Thus, it would be irrational for George to
have no reason, all things considered, to be hit and a reason, all things considered, for
him to be in a boxing match.
The Case of Hanging a Murder
Suppose that Bill had done something such that he deserves to be hung and Bob is
the hangman. Does it follow from the case of ending another person’s life that Bob ought
not to hang Bill? Surely, if we read “deserved to be hung” as providing a reason for
hanging him, then of course Bob ought to hang Bill, but this would just be begging the
question. Rather, it should be read as describing the action Bill had done as being an
action that would be grounds for being hung, if there are any grounds for being hung.
Given my arguments in section 3.1, provided that Bill has reason to do things in
the future, it follows that Bob ought not to hang Bill. However, suppose that Bill had a
reason to engage in a contract with Bob that states that if either of them were to do an
action, such as the action done by Bill, then the one ought to hang the other. In this case,
Bill has a reason, in virtue of the reason for which he entered the contract, to be hung for
having done such an action. I am not sure whether, Bill and Bob have a reason, all things
considered, to agree to a contract with such dire consequences, but it is at least possible.
There is a further question about whether Bill has a reason to uphold his contracts, which
I will not address because it is a substantive question itself and falls outside the scope of
this essay.

boxer was paid to throw the match). However, it seems that this match is a charade and fails to be a real
boxing match, in so far as real boxing matches are genuine competition and not some sort of theatrics.
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5.1 No Positive Duties
It should be asked, why does my argument not extend to positive duties? Suppose
Steve is drowning in a lake and Susan walks by the lake on her way to class. Susan could
rescue Steve instead of going to class and doing so is without significant risk or expense
to Susan. Furthermore, it is true of this case that if Susan continues to class, then Steve
will drown. Ought Susan save Steve?
The argument I have given for negative duties does not extend to positive duties
because of the use of the general account of necessary means. The fact that Steve would
drown is not part of the conditions of satisfaction of Susan’s continuing to class. Again,
this is because the fact that Steve would drown is not part of the conditions of satisfaction
of Susan’s continuing to class in all cases. We can imagine a case in which Susan could
successfully continue on to class and it fail to be the case that Steve drowns. Perhaps,
Peter Singer is on his way to a lecture when he sees Steve drowning and saves him. Thus,
it need not be the case that Steve drowns, if it to be the case that Susan successfully
continues on to class in all cases. This is much different than the cases of negative duties,
where in all cases it is part of the conditions of satisfaction that Jill has sex with Jack and
Bill never does anything ever again, if it is to be the case the Jack has sex with Jill and
Bob ends Bill’s life.
5.2 No Problem for the Rational Authority of Morality
If we understand morality to include only negative duties, then there is no
problem for the rational authority of morality. Agents do have negative duties in so far as
there are actions which all agents fail to have reason to do them. These are actions for
which it fails to be the case that there is a reason for the conditions of satisfaction of that
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action to be met. Furthermore, it can fail to be the case that an agent has a reason to do
such actions even if the agent is most motivated to do so. This is not inconsistent with the
thesis of reason internalism because reason internalism only requires that an agent be
motivated to do an action, not refrain from action. Additionally, the fact that the agent
will do what they are most motivated to do fails to establish such motivations as a
normative reason for action, all things considered.
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